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From 1992 to 1995, forty states applied for federal waivers in order to test new welfare reforms.
About 80 percent of these waiver applications included expansions of earnings disregards and asset limits
for welfare recipients. These changes would effectively reverse the changes imposed by the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA81), which significantly restricted eligibility and reduced earnings
disregards for working recipients. Hence an understanding of the effects of OBRA81 can be helpful in
predicting the effects of new welfare reform proposals.
This paper presents empirical estimates of the labor supply and AFDC participation effects of the
individual components of OBRA81. Estimates are obtained from a discrete-choice maximum likelihood
model in which female heads of household choose among six welfare/work combinations: on or off welfare
together with zero, half-time, or full-time work. The paper focuses on estimation of parameters that define
the utility of leisure and of welfare participation.
Estimates are obtained from a sample of 2462 female heads of household from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), covering the years 1978 to 1984. The changes imposed by OBRA81 are
explicitly accounted for in the budget set, as are the decline in real benefits, changes in the federal tax
system, and the interaction of AFDC and Food Stamps. Estimated utility parameters are used to decompose
the individual effects of the 1981 reforms. Descriptive evidence shows that the overall effect of the
legislation was to reduce participation by about 8 percent and cut the incidence of working recipiency by
more than 40 percent. Simulations based on structural parameters suggest that lower real needs and
payment standards reduced AFDC eligibility and participation by more than the OBRA81 changes
combined. An important result is that for many recipients, the share of Food Stamps in total income
increased as real AFDC benefits declined. Hence the Food Stamps program played an important role over
this period in preventing the well-being of welfare recipients from eroding more than it did.
Estimated utility parameters are also used to predict the effects of hypothetical policy changes.
Lower payment standards cause some recipients to leave welfare and others to increase their work effort.
Working recipiency is significantly encouraged by lower benefit-reduction rates, but this effect is offset by
lower labor supply among women drawn on to AFDC. Finally, the AFDC participation choice is quite
responsive to wage levels, but increasing wages would have only a small effect on working recipiency in the
absence of higher disregards.The Effect of the 1981 Welfare Reforms
on AFDC Participation and Labor Supply
I. INTRODUCTION
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 ends the federal government’s
largest cash assistance program for poor families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
AFDC, which was created as part of the Social Security Act of 1935, will be replaced by a system of
federal block grants given directly to the states, each of which will then be responsible for maintaining its
own welfare program for poor families. The 1996 act limits lifetime welfare participation to five years,
requires able adults to work after two years, and denies participation to noncitizens, both legal and illegal.
It retains the federal Food Stamp program, but with substantial cuts in spending.
Aside from these federal mandates, the design of each state’s welfare program is unrestricted. The
state is free to set benefit formulas, eligibility standards, and the program parameters that determine the
interaction of various income sources. While it is too early to know what each of the new state programs
will look like, evidence of the reforms being considered is provided by recent waiver applications submitted
by states seeking to experiment with their welfare programs. From 1992 to 1995, forty states submitted
waiver requests to the federal government (Savner and Greenberg 1995). Thirty-two of the forty states
included plans to expand earnings disregards so that more recipients can work without losing eligibility.
Thirty-one states planned to raise limits on allowable assets, so that more families may own cars and
maintain savings accounts without losing eligibility.
These two proposals would effectively reverse federal regulations implemented under the 1981
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA81), which restricted earnings disregards and imposed strict
limits on assets. Hence an understanding of the effects of OBRA81 can help in predicting the effects of new
welfare reform proposals.2
     Disutility from welfare participation may arise through welfare stigma or transactions costs.
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This paper presents empirical estimates of the labor supply and AFDC participation effects of the
individual components of OBRA81. Estimates are obtained from a discrete-choice maximum-likelihood
model in which female heads of household choose among six welfare/work combinations: on or off welfare
together with zero, half-time, or full-time work. The estimation is complicated by kinks in the budget
constraint that arise from the loss of welfare benefits at higher income levels, the interaction of the AFDC
and Food Stamp programs, and the progressivity of the federal tax system. Moreover, the simultaneity of
the AFDC participation and labor-supply decisions indicates that the set of kinks faced by each household
is endogenous. Hence for each household a complicated nonlinear budget constraint must be computed for
each possible choice of AFDC participation and labor supply. The discrete-choice approach to labor supply
simplifies this problem considerably, since it reduces the number of points at which the budget constraint
must be evaluated.
While previous models of program participation and labor supply have utilized a reduced-form
participation equation, what is estimated here is an analytically tractable structural model of simultaneous
welfare and work choices. The paper focuses on parameters that define the utility of leisure and of welfare
participation.
1
Data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The model is estimated on a sample
of 2462 female heads of household over the years 1978 to 1984. The changes imposed by the 1981 OBRA
are explicitly accounted for in the budget set, as are declining real benefit levels, changes in the federal tax
system, and the interaction of AFDC and Food Stamps. Estimated utility parameters are used to decompose
the individual effects of the 1981 reforms.
Descriptive evidence shows that the overall effect of the legislation was to reduce participation by
about 8 percent and cut the incidence of working recipiency by more than 40 percent. Simulations based on3
     The “thirty-and-a-third” rule applied only to benefit calculation. When making the initial eligibility
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determination, only work and child care expenses were applied.
structural parameters suggest that lower real needs and payment standards reduced AFDC eligibility and
participation by more than the OBRA81 changes combined. An important result is that for many recipients,
the share of Food Stamps in total income increased as real AFDC benefits declined. Hence the Food
Stamps program played an important role over this period in preventing the well-being of welfare recipients
from eroding more than it did.
Estimated utility parameters are also used to predict the effects of hypothetical policy changes.
Lower payment standards cause some recipients to leave welfare and others to increase their work effort.
Working recipiency is significantly encouraged by lower benefit-reduction rates, but this effect is offset by
lower labor supply among women drawn on to AFDC. Finally, the AFDC participation choice is quite
responsive to wage levels, but increasing wages would have only a small effect on working recipiency in the
absence of higher disregards.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses estimation issues in models of welfare and
work. Section III provides a brief review of the related literature. Section IV outlines the model and details
of the estimation technique. Section V discusses the data and construction of the budget constraint. Section
VI presents estimation and simulation results, and Section VII concludes.
II. ESTIMATION OF MODELS OF WELFARE AND WORK
Participation in AFDC potentially affects labor supply because the AFDC benefit declines with
earnings. The work disincentive inherent in this formula has long been recognized, and in 1967 the rate of
benefit reduction was reduced in an attempt to reduce the disincentive. The 1967 reforms required states to
disregard $30 plus one-third of remaining monthly earnings, plus expenses related to work and child care.
24
     The 1984 Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) and the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) relaxed some of the
3
OBRA81 restrictions, such as reinstating the $30 (but not the one-third) earnings disregard, increasing the
work-expense and child-care expense disregard caps, and increasing the gross eligibility screen to 185
percent of the state’s need standard.
     Though the focus of this paper is on AFDC participation, Food Stamp benefits are included because
4
almost all AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps. Conversely, I assume Food Stamp participation
ends whenever AFDC participation ends.
     Figure 1a was calculated using the median predicted real wage of my 1978 sample, $7.92, and the
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median real needs and payment standards for a family of two in 1978, $468 and $419, respectively. The
calculation assumes zero unearned income (aside from AFDC and Food Stamps), and assumes that the
worker filed a head-of-household return and took the appropriate Earned Income Tax Credit.
The 1981 reforms repealed the thirty-and-a-third disregard after four consecutive months of earnings. In
addition, OBRA81 limited the work-expense and child-care expense disregards, and changed the order of
disregards in a way that reduced the total amount disregarded.
OBRA81 also imposed new eligibility restrictions. Before the 1981 law, families whose countable
income (income net of disregards) was less than the state’s need standard were entitled to benefits.
OBRA81 denied eligibility to families whose pre-disregard income was over 150 percent of the state need
standard. Finally, OBRA81 imposed a new asset limit of $1000 per family, not including the value of a
home and up to $1500 for one car. The overall result of these changes was that drastically fewer recipients
could maintain eligibility while working, and hence the work disincentive in the AFDC program was
significantly increased.
3
In principle, estimating the effect of the AFDC program on labor supply is simply a matter of
estimating a labor-supply equation with respect to a piecewise-linear budget constraint. Kinks arise in the
budget constraint from the loss of welfare benefits at higher income levels, the interaction of the AFDC and
Food Stamps programs,  and the progressivity of the federal tax system.
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Typical budget constraints for welfare recipients are shown in Figures 1a and 1b. Figure 1a depicts
a monthly budget constraint facing a median low-income worker in 1978.  The straight diagonal line
55
represents a hypothetical budget constraint in the absence of any taxes or transfers. This line has a constant
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     One hundred-sixty-seven hours per month corresponds to a standard definition of “full-time work,”
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which is 2000 hours per year. Hence “leisure” is measured relative to full-time work, not relative to the
total number of hours in the month.
     In this figure, AFDC benefits are taxed at 67 percent of earnings and Food Stamps are taxed at 30
7
percent of earnings. When calculating Food Stamp benefits, AFDC benefits are also counted and taxed at
30 percent, though the reverse interaction is not true. This explains why eligibility for Food Stamps ends
before eligibility for AFDC.
     The median real wage in the sample in 1982 was $7.75, and the median real needs and payment
8
standards were $388 and $300, respectively.
     Calculations assume the four-month period of the thirty-and-a-third disregard has expired; hence AFDC
9
benefits are taxed at 100 percent of earnings.
     Recall that Food Stamp benefits are assumed to end with AFDC participation.
10
horizontal axis, with the maximum set to 167.  The kinked line represents the budget constraint faced by
6
the worker after federal taxes and transfers. Starting at the right-hand side of the figure, the value of the
kinked budget constraint at zero hours of work (full-time leisure) represents income from AFDC and Food
Stamps only. Moving to the left, total income increases as the worker adds earnings to transfer income. The
first kink represents the end of disregards and the beginning of the benefit-reduction region.  The notch
7
represents the loss of eligibility for Food Stamps, and the final kink represents the loss of eligibility for
AFDC. At full-time work (the left-hand side of the figure), the slope of the kinked budget line is constant
and equal to the negative of the product of the wage rate and the federal marginal tax rate.
Figure 1b depicts the budget constraint facing the median worker in 1982, after OBRA81 was
implemented.  The 1982 budget constraint is strikingly different from the 1978 constraint. Disregards end
8
at a lower level of work, and benefits are taxed at 100 percent when disregards end, resulting in a
completely flat region of the budget constraint.  The notch corresponding to the loss of eligibility occurs
9
sooner and is significantly larger than in 1978; this is because AFDC and Food Stamp eligibility end at the
same level of income.  The increased work disincentive in Figure 1b is readily seen: along the flat portion,
108
     See Moffitt (1983) for the first analysis of welfare stigma.
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leisure can be increased without reducing income. Note also that this AFDC recipient could work part time
(80 hours) in 1978 without losing eligibility, but could not in 1982.
Given the correct piecewise linear budget constraint for each individual, it is natural to consider
estimating the impact of the AFDC benefit reduction rate on labor supply from a sample of AFDC
participants. A straightforward approach is to assume utility maximization subject to the nonlinear budget
constraint, and estimate how the labor-supply choices of recipients change with the benefit-reduction rate. 
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the endogeneity of AFDC participation. The
presence of significant numbers of nonparticipating eligibles suggests individual heterogeneity in tastes for
welfare participation. Researchers have speculated that a socially derived sense of stigma may account for
nonparticipation of some eligible individuals, as well as the presence of transactions costs, such as the time
spent waiting in line or reporting to welfare authorities.
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The fact that some eligible individuals choose not to participate implies that the form of the budget
constraint is endogenous, since nonparticipants do not face the kinks created by the means-tested benefits.
This is problematic because unobserved components of tastes for welfare are likely to be correlated with
unobserved components of tastes for work, which implies that labor-supply responses of participants are
likely to vary systematically from those of nonparticipants. Put differently, changes in AFDC parameters
affect behavior on the extensive margin (i.e., change an individual’s probability of being a recipient) as well
as on the intensive margin (i.e., changing a recipient’s probability of working). Consequently, the AFDC-
participation decision must be estimated simultaneously with the labor-supply decision.
The need to estimate the labor-supply equation jointly with a limited-dependent variable
participation equation complicates the estimation problem considerably, especially when modeling the more
accurate budget set that includes Food Stamp benefits and federal taxes. This paper follows the approach9
of Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Hoynes (1996), Van Soest (1995), and Keane and Moffitt (1996) in
modeling a discrete, rather than continuous, hours choice. Not only does this approach avoid the necessity
of computing the locations of numerous segments and kink points, but it also makes available a powerful
multinomial discrete-choice framework for analyzing the simultaneous work-welfare choice. Consequently,
the hours choice is divided into three discrete choices, representing no work, part-time work, and full-time
work.
III. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Over the last thirty years, a large empirical literature has developed that reports reduced-form
estimates of the impact of AFDC program rules on the labor supply of participants. Danziger, Haveman,
and Plotnick (1981) and Moffitt (1992) review the evidence on the effect of AFDC on labor supply,
concluding that the research shows unequivocally that AFDC generates nontrivial work disincentives, with
estimated magnitudes ranging from 10 to 50 percent of pre-transfer labor supply. Moffitt (1992) also
reviews the evidence on the effect of AFDC parameters (mainly the benefit level and the benefit-reduction
rate) on welfare participation. Almost all studies find a statistically significant increase in participation
probabilities with respect to the benefit level, and a statistically significant decrease with respect to the
benefit-reduction rate. Blank and Ruggles (1996) explore the determinants of openings and closings of
eligibility spells versus participation spells in AFDC and Food Stamps. They find that many spells of
eligibility end without participation, and many spells of participation end before eligibility is lost. Some of
these spell closings they attribute to unreported earnings.
A small literature of reduced-form studies of OBRA81 also exists. Moffitt (1986) reviewed the
evidence on the effects of OBRA81 on labor supply, concluding that there is some evidence that the higher
benefit-reduction rate reduced hours of labor supplied. But the available studies, he argued, provided only10
     Note that the imposition of OBRA81 coincides with the onset of the 1982 recession. The national
12
average unemployment rate was 5.8 percent in 1979 and 9.6 percent in 1983.
weak evidence, ended too soon (none extended beyond the first few months of 1983, while OBRA81 was
implemented in 1982), and suffered from design flaws. Feaster, Gottschalk, and Jakubson (1987) used
administrative panel data from Wisconsin to estimate the effect of OBRA81, finding little effect on months
worked. Again, the study was limited to short-run effects (following women through September 1982), and
did not address the impact of OBRA81 on AFDC participation. Hutchens (1986) reviews six reduced-form
studies of OBRA81, citing evidence that the 1981 law reduced the probability of being a working recipient
and increased the probability of leaving the program.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the net effect of OBRA81 on the labor supply of recipients comes
from administrative records kept by the federal government. The records show that in 1979, 5.4 percent of
recipients worked part time and 8.7 percent worked full time. By 1983, only 3.4 percent worked part time,
and only 1.5 percent worked full time (Green Book 1994).  However, these records do not capture changes
12
in labor supply among women who left AFDC as a result of OBRA81.
Recognizing that labor supply and AFDC participation decisions are made jointly, the literature
has moved in the last fifteen years toward models featuring simultaneous labor-supply and AFDC
participation choice. At the same time, the literature has been moving toward structural models, in which a
utility framework is specified for the choice problem. Rather than estimating reduced-form coefficients, the
goal of the structural literature has been to obtain estimates of underlying utility parameters, which can
then be used to simulate the effects of any number of policy changes.
Recently, both trends in the literature have come together, producing papers which estimate
structural models of simultaneous labor-supply and program-participation choices. Fraker and Moffitt
(1988), Hoynes (1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1996) are important papers in this genre. Such models
must overcome the difficult, if not intractable, problems inherent in estimating simultaneous equations of11
     The numerical evaluation of second- or third-order integrals is well within the capability of modern
13
computers. It is the intractability of the choice problem that presents the biggest obstacle. 
limited dependent variables. The primary difficulty faced by these models is the lack of a tractable analytic
solution to the choice problem, while a secondary issue is the need to evaluate multiple integrals.  The lack
13
of a tractable analytic, or algebraic, solution to the individual’s simultaneous choice problem makes it
impossible to derive estimates of utility parameters directly from the individual’s maximization problem in
the standard way.
Each of the papers mentioned above has addressed the tractability problem differently. Fraker and
Moffitt simplify their model of labor supply and AFDC and Food Stamp participation by estimating
reduced-form, rather than structural, AFDC participation equations. In her study of labor supply and
AFDC-UP participation, Hoynes simplifies the choice problem by assuming discrete, rather than
continuous, distributions on the two error terms. Finally, in their study of labor supply and multiple-
program participation, Keane and Moffitt solve both the choice problem and the numerical evaluation
problem by using recently developed techniques of simulation estimation.
IV. THE MODEL AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
In order to estimate the effects of OBRA81 on labor supply and AFDC participation, this paper
develops a structural model of simultaneous choice for which there is a tractable analytic solution.
Estimates of utility parameters can then be derived directly from the choice problem using maximum
likelihood estimation. The application of the structural model to the specific policy change allows a detailed
decomposition of the effects of the 1981 reforms. In addition, by comparing predictions from the model to
observed outcomes after the reforms, the policy change is used as a historical benchmark against which toU(L,Y,P) U(L,Y) P,
L(H) L H and
Y(H, P) wH N B(H,w, N) P T(H,w, N),
UL > 0 UY > 0,
12
     I refrain from using the term “stigma” because disutility from participation may also be due to
14
transactions costs.




assess the predictive power of the model. Finally, the model is used to simulate the effects on labor supply
and program participation of various recent welfare reform proposals.
Discretizing the hours choice into no work, part-time work, and full-time work transforms the
estimation problem into a two-equation discrete-choice problem with six alternatives: the three hours points
together with on or off welfare. The individual’s objective is to choose the alternative that maximizes utility
subject to the nonlinear budget constraint. Consider a simple class of utility functions that are separable in
participation utility:
14
where L represents leisure, Y is income, and P=1 if the individual participates. Note that even when
and   as is usually assumed, an individual with sufficiently large distaste for welfare,  ,
may decline to participate even when participation increases both leisure and income.
The budget constraint takes the form:
where H represents the hours choice, w is the wage rate, N is nonlabor income, B is the sum of AFDC and
Food Stamp benefits, and T represents positive federal taxes.  The endogeneity of the form of the budget
15dj 1 iff Uj Uj j
13
(3)
constraint is made explicit by the appearance of the choice variable P in equation (2). The nonlinearity of
the budget constraint enters via B and T. 
To implement the discrete-choice approach, let d = 1 if (P,H) = j. Then: j
where U  U(Y, (P, H) = j). Equation (3) is the revealed-preference inequality. This will form the basis of j
the choice probability, and hence the individual’s contribution to the likelihood function.
Estimation of the model defined by equations (1)–(3) requires three steps for each individual: first,
calculation of the budget set (i.e., payoffs from each of the six alternatives); second, analytical derivation
of the regions of error space within which each alternative is optimal; and third, evaluation of the choice
probability.
It is the second step that has been intractable in recent studies. It is tractable here because what is
estimated here is a “lower-order” problem, in the sense that it involves fewer alternatives (six) and a lower-
dimensional error space (two). By contrast, Fraker and Moffitt’s study of labor supply, AFDC, and Food
Stamps features twelve alternatives and three error terms. Hoynes’ analysis of the two-parent AFDC-UP
program and labor supply features eighteen alternatives and three error terms. Finally, Keane and Moffitt’s
study of labor supply and multiple-program participation features twenty-four alternatives and five error
terms. The high dimensionality of these models renders the analytic solution to choice problem intractable.
The narrower focus of the present study makes the solution to the analytic problem tractable. The
three hours points and two program options define six discrete choices. The six alternatives, in turn, impose
five revealed-preference inequalities for each choice. To translate the revealed-preference inequalities intoUij lnYij iln Lj i Pj ,
14
     An important caveat is that for a given individual, certain alternatives may be dominated over the entire
16
error space.
     Put differently, the region in error space within which a given choice is optimal may be irregularly
17
shaped, because the boundaries of the region may be formed by the envelope of several planes. Which
plane forms the boundary depends on the location within the region.
(4)
choice probabilities, the inequalities are written as restrictions on the two error terms. The two-dimensional
error space can then be mapped into regions in which each choice is optimal.
16
With five restrictions on two error terms, it must be the case that three inequalities do not bind.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know a priori which restrictions will bind, because the planes that divide
the error space are functions of the error terms themselves, as well as of data and parameters. For example,
which constraint on the second error term binds depends on the realization of the first error term.  The
17
inability to predict which inequalities bind suggests that the estimation algorithm itself must calculate the
boundaries and impose the binding constraints.
For the functional form of the utility function, this paper assumes a standard log-linear
specification:
where U  represents individual i’s utility from choice j, Y is income,   indexes individual i’s utility of ij i
leisure, L represents leisure,   indexes participation utility, and P = 1 if the individual participates. i
Normalizing the income-utility parameter to one helps identify the model, and has the effect of translating
the remaining parameters into money terms. Note that when   > 0 and   > 0, then U  > 0, U  > 0, U  < 0, i i Y L YY
U  < 0, and U  = U  = 0. Hence, this functional form is a convenient way to impose diminishing LL YL LY
marginal utility in income and leisure. The assumption of zero cross-derivatives is restrictive, but it has the
strong advantage of analytical convenience, simplifying the calculation of utility differences.i Xi i
i Xi i
15
     The primary estimation algorithm used was a standard gradient-based maximum likelihood method
18
using numerical integration of the bivariate integral. However, the same result was observed simulating out
the bivariate integral with a simulated maximum likelihood (SML) algorithm, and even under a
nongradient-based simulated annealing (SA) algorithm.
(5)
The stochastic specification allows for individual heterogeneity in both a labor-supply preference
parameter and an AFDC-participation preference parameter. The heterogeneity comes from preference
components unobserved by the econometrician but known to the individual (hence the individual’s problem
is deterministic). Furthermore, the econometrician should treat the unobserved preference components as
potentially correlated.
The stochastic specification allows observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity in the labor-
supply and AFDC preference parameters:
where E(X ) = E(X ) = 0 and ( ,  )   N(0,  ). Initially, this model was estimated with the elements of
the covariance matrix   unrestricted. However, for all available specifications of   and  , the estimation i i
algorithm pushed the estimate of  , the correlation coefficient between the two error terms, close enough to
the limit of one to render the algorithm unstable. This result was robust to available choices of the elements
of the vectors X, the scaling of the data, and even the estimation algorithm itself.  Hence the results that i
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follow are based on the model estimated with the restriction   = 0.99 imposed. A correlation coefficient
close to one is not theoretically problematic; it means only that for this model and data set, the effects of
unobserved characteristics on the preference for welfare are virtually identical to the effects of unobserved
characteristics on the preference for leisure. Put differently, unobserved characteristics that affect tastes for
welfare invariably also affect tastes for work, and by the same magnitude. This is not entirely surprising,P(dij Xi , ) P(Uij Ui j Xi , )
16
     As will be discussed in Section VI, the restricted model converges well and performs well in predicting
19
the actual choices made by the sample. An alternative restricted model with rho imposed to one, which
collapses to a univariate model, converges quickly to similar parameters, but does not predict the actual
choices of the sample quite as well.
     As noted previously, there will be more than one restriction per error term, so that only one restriction
20
per error term will bind.
(6)
given the empirical regularity that for the vast majority of female heads of household, work and welfare are
perfect substitutes.
19
The first step in estimating the model is an accurate calculation of each individual’s budget
constraint. Construction of the budget constraint is described in detail in Section V. With the payoffs for
each choice for each individual in hand, the second step is analytical calculation of the implied restrictions
on the error terms that correspond to an individual’s observed choice. These are obtained by solving the
appropriate set of revealed-preference inequalities for the two error terms.
20
In the third step, the likelihood function is formed by translating the error-term restrictions into
choice probabilities, and summing over individuals. Let P(d   X,  ) denote the probability of choosing j
work-welfare option j, conditional on a vector of observed characteristics and unknown parameters. Then
the probability that individual I chooses choice j is:
Recall that because the revealed-choice inequality imposes five restrictions on two error terms,
three of the five revealed-preference inequalities will not bind. Given the specification of the model, the
revealed-preference inequalities take the form:< a1(X, )
< a2(X, )
< b1(X, )
< b2(X, , )
< b3(X, , ),
P(dj X, )




log P(dij Xi, ),






where a , a , and b  are constant functions of data and parameters, and b  and b  are functions of data, 1 2 1 2 3
parameters, and  . In general, only the minimum a function and minimum b function will bind. The
minimum b function is found by integrating out  . The choice probability is thus:
and the log-likelihood function is:
where d  represents the probability that individual I chose the observed choice. Parameters are estimated by ij
maximizing L with respect to  . The evaluation of the min functions in the limits is not problematic;
however, their presence does make the gradient of the likelihood discontinuous. This is inconvenient when
using a derivative-based maximization algorithm, because jumps in the gradient impede convergence of the
estimator. Fortunately this problem can be addressed by utilizing the following smooth approximation to
the min function:18
     A small positive k will approximate the max. I thank John Rust for suggesting this technique.
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     More recent waves of the PSID include monthly measures of several variables. The annual data
22
problem and a method for reducing its severity will be discussed later in this section.
     The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) has monthly observations, but it began after
23
the 1981 reforms were enacted.
for small negative k.  In the estimation that follows, I use k = -0.01. Standard errors are calculated from
21
the outer product of the gradient of L.
V. THE DATA, THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE BUDGET SET
The Data
To build a model that performs well in predicting actual choices, it is important to capture the
budget constraint as accurately as possible. This section describes the construction of the individual budget
constraints for the sample used in this paper.
Data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID has two main advantages
over other data sources: its detailed questions on income sources and labor supply, and a time frame long
enough to span the pre-1981 and post-1981 periods. A disadvantage of the PSID is that it contains annual,
rather than monthly, observations over the OBRA81 period. Monthly observations are preferable in
estimating labor supply and AFDC participation choice because individuals may experience separate spells
of work and welfare in a single year.  Despite this disadvantage, however, the PSID appears to be the best
22
source of data for this model.
23
The sample includes all female heads of household with children from the 1978, 1980, 1982 and
1984 waves of the PSID. While the AFDC program does include some male-headed households, female
heads are usually studied because they are overrepresented in the low-income population and make up the
vast majority of AFDC cases. The period 1978 to 1984 is chosen to capture a relatively wide observation19
     Sampling beyond 1984 raises new difficulties because the 1984 DEFRA was implemented in early
24
1985.
     One hundred-twenty annual hours corresponds to 2.5 hours per week for 48 weeks and 1680 annual
25
hours corresponds to 35 hours per week for 48 weeks.
of both the pre-OBRA81 and post-OBRA81 periods.  Since estimation is computationally intensive, only
24
alternating years were sampled in order to keep the sample size from growing too large. Observations on
female-headed households with children from each year were pooled to form the sample. Individuals older
than 60 and disabled individuals were dropped, because these individuals are likely to have systematically
different labor-force attachments. The final sample has 2462 observations.
Definition of the Dependent Variables
Individuals are said to participate in AFDC if they report any AFDC income for the year. Labor-
supply choices are assigned in the following way: those who report 1681 or more annual hours are said to
work full time, those who report 120 to 1680 annual hours of work are said to work part time, and all
others are assigned zero hours of work.
25
A significant problem with an annual data set is imperfect observations of welfare and work spells.
For example, an individual who experiences a three-month spell of welfare without work, followed by a
nine-month spell of full-time work without welfare, is recorded in the PSID as an AFDC recipient who
worked part time, even though she never worked while on welfare. An examination of the observed
distribution of individuals across the six work-welfare choices confirms the significance of this problem.
Table 1, Panel A shows the “unadjusted” distribution of work-welfare choices. Fully 32 percent of
participants are recorded as working part time, while administrative records indicate only 4 to 6 percent of
AFDC recipients are working part time. Note that these measures are not strictly comparable for two
reasons. First, the PSID measure is over the19
TABLE 1
Observed Distributions of Labor Supply and AFDC Participation
(Percentage of sample)
A. Unadjusted Distributions
                      Labor Supply                      
Nonworkers Part Time Full Time Row Total
Joint Distribution 
Off AFDC 9.9% 21.3% 36.3% 67.5%
On AFDC 19.5% 10.3% 2.7% 32.5%
Conditional on AFDC
Off AFDC 14.6% 31.5% 53.8% 100.0%
On AFDC 59.9% 31.7% 8.4% 100.0%
B. Adjusted Distributions
                      Labor Supply                      
Nonworkers Part Time Full Time Row Total
Joint Distribution
Off AFDC 9.9% 21.3% 36.3% 67.5%
On AFDC 26.3% 4.4% 1.9% 32.5%
Conditional on AFDC
Off AFDC 14.6% 31.5% 53.8% 100.0%
On AFDC 80.9% 13.4% 5.7% 100.0%21
course of a year, and hence reflects cumulative spells of work, while the administrative record is at a given
point in time. Second, it is likely that some recipients work without reporting the employment to
caseworkers.
Still, it is likely that the PSID measure is overstating part-time work among recipients. This
interpretation is supported by comparing these numbers to the analogous numbers in Fraker and Moffitt
and Keane and Moffitt. Fraker and Moffitt, using quarterly pre-1981 data, find that 14 percent of
participants work part time, and 14 percent work full time. Keane and Moffitt, using monthly post-1981
data, find 5 percent of participants work part time, and 4 percent work full time.
Given the inability to observe the pattern of spells of work and welfare with annual data, the
question arises whether a given AFDC recipient who is recorded in the PSID as working part of the year
worked concurrently with AFDC receipt, or worked during a spell without AFDC. If she did not work
concurrently with AFDC receipt, then she should be recorded as a nonworker, rather than a part-time
worker.
This question cannot be fully answered without monthly observations. But the answer can be
approximated by comparing actual reported AFDC benefits with predicted benefits under two competing
scenarios: first, that recipients worked while receiving benefits, and second, that recipients did not work
while receiving benefits. Individuals whose reported AFDC benefits were consistent with being nonworkers
while receiving welfare were reclassified as nonworking recipients, resulting in an adjusted empirical joint
work-welfare distribution. The adjusted distribution is shown in Table 1, Panel B. Over half of the
recipients who were recorded as part-time workers were reclassified on the basis of their reported benefit
levels: the proportion of recipients working part time falls from 31.7 percent to a more believable 13.4
percent, and the proportion working full-time falls from 8.4 percent to 5.7 percent. The analysis that
follows is based on the adjusted distribution of work-welfare choices.22
Table 1, Panel B also shows that 33 percent of female heads in the sample participated in AFDC.
As in previous studies, the joint distribution of labor supply and participation is strikingly asymmetric: 81
percent of participants are nonworkers, while 54 percent of nonparticipants work full time.
Construction of the Budget Set
To estimate the parametric model, each individual’s earnings, federal taxes, and benefits must be
calculated for all six choices. Real monthly earnings were predicted by multiplying the hourly real wage by
80 for part-time work and 160 for full-time work. A common problem when predicting earnings is the lack
of wage data for nonworkers. In this paper, predicted wages are used for all workers. Predictions were
made with a standard selection-corrected wage regression using my sample of working female heads of
household. Regressors included a constant, nonwhite dummy, age, age squared, education, county
unemployment rate, inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage labor-force participation probit, and a complete
set of state dummies. The distribution of predicted wages is given in Figure 2. The mean predicted wage is
$7.96 in constant 1994 dollars, the median is $7.82, and the standard deviation is $2.23.
The second component in constructing the budget constraint is the calculation of federal taxes.
Federal income and social security taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) were predicted for each
individual at each hours point. The calculation was made assuming workers filed a head-of-household
return, claimed themselves and children as exemptions, and took the standard deduction. Marginal tax
rates, brackets, and exemption amounts for 1978 to 1984 were taken from Pechman (1987). The Social
Security wage base and tax rates from 1978 to 1984 were taken from Section 3 of the 1994 Green Book.
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     This figure was calculated for a woman with two children and zero taxable unearned income.
26
     In most states, the payment standard is smaller than the needs standard.
27
Figure 3 shows how the 1982 income tax, social security tax, and EITC vary as earnings
increase.  Due to dependent exemptions and progressively higher marginal tax rates, the income tax graph
26
remains zero for the first dollars of earnings, then increases at an increasing rate. By contrast, the social
security tax begins with the first dollar of earnings, but grows at a constant rate. The EITC phases in with
the income tax, remains constant at its maximum amount, and then phases out.
The final component in constructing the budget constraint is the calculation of AFDC and Food
Stamps benefits. For observations before OBRA81, AFDC benefits are computed according to the
following formula:
B(s,w,H) = max {G(s) - C(w,H), 0 } if C(w,H) < N(s), and
B(s,w,H) = 0 otherwise,
where G(s) is the state’s payment standard for a family of size s, N(s) is the state’s needs standard  for a
27
family of size s, and C(w,H) is countable income, defined by:
C(w,H) = max {0.67*[wH - 30] - WD + N, 0 },
where wH represents gross earnings, WD is the work-expense disregard, and N is countable unearned
income. This includes asset income and all transfer income except Food Stamp benefits and the first $50 of
child support payments.25
For observations after OBRA81, AFDC benefits are computed according to a slightly different
formula:
B(s,w,H) = max {G(s) - C(w,H), 0 } if C(w,H) < N(s),
if wH + N < 1.5*N(s), if assets<1000
and if B > 10, 
and B(s,w,H) = 0 otherwise.
This formula represents the addition of the gross-income eligibility test and the minimum paid benefit of
$10 per month.
Countable income is also defined differently:
C(w,H) = max {0.89*[wH - 30 - WD] + N, 0 }.
The benefit-reduction rate of 0.89 is a weighted average of the two values faced by a working
recipient over the course of a year: four months at 0.67 and eight months at 1.00. This is a necessary
approximation due to the lack of monthly employment data. Note also that after OBRA81, the work-
expense disregard is applied before the thirty-and-a-third disregard (when the latter is available), resulting
in a smaller amount disregarded.
State need and payment standards are taken from Characteristics of State Plans (U.S. DHHS,
various years). Data on the mean work-expense disregard granted by year and state were not available, so
national means by year were used. These were obtained from the 1994 Green Book. Since very few26
     An alternative source of information on disregards by state is the set of “effective tax rates” estimated
28
by Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf (1986). However, these are somewhat problematic because (1) they represent
average, rather than marginal, tax rates and hence misrepresent the budget constraint, (2) they are averaged
over all recipients within a state, (3) many of the estimates are obtained from very small sample sizes, and
(4) they may be subject to selection bias. There is concern among some researchers that these estimates of
effective tax rates significantly underrepresent actual benefit-reduction rates.
     I thank Robert Moffitt for providing the Food Stamp parameters and formulas.
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recipients claim a child care disregard (1.3 percent of recipients in 1982), this disregard was not included.
28
The PSID does not include information on assets, but does include income from assets. This income was
capitalized to yield an estimate of assets. Families reporting more than one vehicle were categorized as
ineligible.
Food Stamp benefits were included for all AFDC recipients. These were calculated according to
the following formula:
F(s,w,H) = max { FG(s) - FC(w,H), 0 } ,
where FG(s) is the Food Stamp guarantee standard for a family of size s. FC(w,H) represents income
countable against Food Stamps, and is defined by:
FC(w,H) = max {0.3*[(wH*(1-EIC) + N - SD - RD], 0 } ,
where EIC is the earned-income credit (18 percent), N is all unearned income, including AFDC benefits,
SD is the standard deduction, and RD is the rent deduction. The Food Stamps program is administered
federally, and hence there is no variation of parameters across states. Also, unlike AFDC benefits, Food
Stamp benefits and disregards are indexed to inflation.
2927
Figures 4a and 4b show how AFDC and Food Stamps benefits interact and decline with earnings
for a median-wage worker in a state with median benefit levels and with two children. Note that part of this
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     Again, it is important to note the post-OBRA81 period coincided with a major national recession, so
30
not all of the change in Table 3 and Figure 5 is directly attributable to the 1981 law.
Stamp benefits. This is a result of the interaction between the AFDC and Food Stamp benefit formulas.
Table 2 summarizes the budget constraint information by hours choice for median wage-earners in
1978 and 1982. A striking difference is the loss of AFDC eligibility for the median-wage part-time worker
after OBRA81.
Descriptive Statistics from the Sample
Nonparametric evidence of the disincentive effect of OBRA81 is shown in Table 3, Panels A and
B, which break down the empirical work-welfare distribution by regime. Panel A shows the distribution of
participation and labor supply prior to the 1981 reforms, while Panel B shows the analogous distribution
after the reforms. As mentioned above, the 1981 reforms restricted eligibility and reduced the payoff to
working by adding a gross income test, capping work-expense and child-care expense disregards, and
increasing the benefit-reduction rate to 100 percent after four consecutive months of work.
30
As might be expected, the differences appear mostly in the second row, which represents the labor
supply of AFDC participants. The differences are most easily seen in Figures 5a and 5b, which give
histograms of observed choices by regime. The percentage of recipients working full time fell by over half,
from 8.4 percent to just 3 percent, while the percentage working part time decreased about 25 percent, from
15.3 percent to 11.3 percent. The proportion not working increased by about 12 percent, from 76.3 percent
to 85.6 percent. The overall proportion of the sample that participated in AFDC decreased about 8 percent,
from 34 percent to 31 percent.
A common way of understanding the behavior of potential participants is to look at participation
rates conditional on eligibility for benefits. While this statistic may be difficult to28
TABLE 2
Value of Budget Constraint at Median Wage
by Hours Choice, 1978 and 1982
(Constant 1994 Dollars)
                   1978                    1982
         Median Wage = $7.92                  Median Wage = $7.75         
No Work Part Time Full Time No Work Part Time Full Time
Earnings 0 634 1267 0 620 1240
Income Tax 0 0 -58 0 0 -79
Soc. Sec. Tax 0 -38 -77 0 -42 -83
EITC 0 0 39 0 0 56
AFDC 388 214 0 300 0 0
Food Stamps 155 52 0 182 0 0
Total 543 861 1171 482 578 113329
TABLE 3
Observed Distributions of Labor Supply and AFDC Participation
(Percentage of sample)
A. Pre-1981
                      Labor Supply                      
Nonworkers Part Time Full Time Row Total
Joint Distribution
Off AFDC 8.3% 20.3% 37.3% 66.0%
On AFDC 26.0% 5.2% 2.9% 34.0%
Conditional on AFDC
Off AFDC 12.6% 30.8% 56.6% 100.0%
On AFDC 76.3% 15.3% 8.4% 100.0%
B. Post-1981
                      Labor Supply                      
Nonworkers Part Time Full Time Row Total
Joint Distribution
Off AFDC 11.3% 22.2% 35.4% 68.9%
On AFDC 26.7% 3.5% 0.9% 31.1%
Conditional on AFDC
Off AFDC 16.4% 32.2% 51.4% 100.0%
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     The participation rate among eligibles at full-time work is extremely unreliable, since so few
31
individuals are eligible at full-time work.
interpret, since eligibility is a function of labor supply and hence is essentially endogenous, it is
nevertheless often used in the literature. Table 4 shows participation rates among eligibles, taking their
observed hours choice as given. This table shows again that eligibility was significantly restricted after
1981, falling from 53 percent of the sample to 32 percent of the sample, taking observed labor supply as
given. However, it also suggests that the participation rate among eligibles increased, from 64 percent of
eligibles before 1981 to 97 percent of eligibles after 1981.
31
  Table 5 shows the means of key variables used in the parametric analysis, by regime. Comparison
of the means across regimes shows little change in socioeconomic characteristics. An exception is a 42
percent increase in the mean county unemployment rate, from 5.6 percent before 1981 to 8.0 percent after
1981. This coincides with the onset of the national 1982 recession. Real hourly wages, net part-time
earnings, and net full-time earnings each fell 3 to 5 percent. Average (nonzero) transfer income, excluding
AFDC and Food Stamps, fell 17 percent, from $396 to $329. Average (nonzero) welfare benefits for the
three hours categories fell 12 to 16 percent.
The most striking changes are in the percentage of the sample who would be eligible for benefits at
the three hours points. Even at zero hours the percentage eligible declines from 80 percent to 75 percent;
this is mainly due to the new asset limits. At part-time work the percentage eligible falls drastically from 67
percent to 17 percent, and at full-time work virtually none of the sample remains eligible: the percentage
eligible falls from 22 percent to just 1 percent. These drastic changes represent the combined effect of three
major changes over the period 1978 to 1984: strict new eligibility rules, higher benefit-reduction rates, and
lower real need and payment standards. The first two changes were implemented as part of the 1981 law,
while the third change occurred concurrently32
TABLE 4
AFDC Participation Rate among Eligibles, Taking Labor Supply as Given
                      Labor Supply                      
No Work Part Time Full Time All
Full Sample
% Eligible 77 41 11 42
% Part | Eligible 96.1 45.2 44.5 77.4
Before 1981
% Eligible 80 67 22 53.2
% Part | Eligible 96.8 31.7 32.4 64
After 1981
% Eligible 75 17 1 32.3
% Part | Eligible 94.7 94.4 240.0 96.5
a
This result is unreliable due to small sample size. Only 5 individuals in this cell were predicted to be
a
eligible, while 12 individuals reported AFDC.33
TABLE 5
Means of Key Variables
Full Sample Pre-1981 Post-1981
Means of Choice Variables
AFDC = 1 0.33 0.34 0.31
Nonparticipants
Not Working=1 0.13 0.11 0.15
Part Time=1 0.33 0.32 0.33
Full Time=1 0.54 0.57 0.51
Participants
Not Working=1 0.74 0.77 0.83
Part Time=1 0.19 0.21 0.14
Full Time=1 0.05 0.07 0.03
Means of Socioeconomic Variables
# Kids 1.99 2.03 1.96
Child < 6 0.51 0.49 0.52
Age 32.71 32.82 32.61
Education 11.45 11.32 11.58
Nonwhite 0.77 0.75 0.78
Unemployment Rate 6.86 5.63 8.01
Means of Budget Constraint Variables (in constant 1994 $)
Hourly wage 7.96 8.07 7.86
Monthly: (all means are exclusive of zeros)
Part-Time Earnings, Net of Fed. Tax 591.83 602.09 582.27
Full-Time Earnings, Net of Fed. Tax 1141.05 1168.93 1115.09
Asset Income 209.22 239.16 180.34
Percent Nonzero 7% 7% 7%
Transfers (excludes AFDC & FS) 361.43 396.47 328.82
Percent Nonzero 53% 53% 53%
AFDC+FS Benefits at zero work 509.01 551.35 466.88
Percent Nonzero 77% 80% 75%
AFDC+FS Benefits at PT work 341.91 353.91 298.04
Percent Nonzero 41% 67% 17%
AFDC+FS Benefits at FT work 254.29 255.57 226.23
Percent Nonzero 11% 22% 1%36
     That is, the utility parameters themselves are assumed to stay constant over the entire period. 
32
but indirectly, as state legislatures failed to increase nominal benefit values during a period of high
inflation. The individual effects of these components will be discussed in the next section.
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND SIMULATIONS
Results of the maximum likelihood estimation are shown in Table 6. Parameter estimates are
mostly as expected. The utility of leisure (or distaste for work) has a positive intercept and increases with
the presence of small children and the county unemployment rate. Older and better educated individuals
have lower tastes for leisure, and hence are more likely to work. The effect of the number of children on the
utility of leisure has the unexpected sign, but is imprecisely estimated. The disutility of AFDC participation
has a positive intercept, and is large relative to the other participation utility parameters, indicating the
presence of welfare stigma or transactions costs. The effect of education on the participation utility has the
unexpected sign, but is very imprecisely estimated. Stigma or transactions costs are lower for nonwhite
households, which is consistent with previous studies.
To test the fit and predictive power of the model, Table 7 compares the actual versus predicted
distributions of labor supply and AFDC participation, using the full sample. The predictions were made
using the estimated utility parameters from Table 6, and the appropriate benefit and eligibility rules.  The
32
table indicates that overall, the model does reasonably well at predicting observed behavior. Three of the
six predicted cell frequencies are within four percentage points of the actual cell frequencies. The model
underpredicts non-AFDC nonworkers (4.6 percent predicted vs. 9.9 percent actual), overpredicts non-
AFDC part-time work (26.0 percent predicted vs. 21.3 percent35
TABLE 6
Parameter Estimates
Variable Leisure Participation Cost
Constant 3.2840* 0.4593
(0.1877) (0.2481)
# Children -0.0257 —
(0.0207)
Child < 6 0.2173* —
(0.0527)
County Unemployment Rate 0.1204 —
(0.0791)







log likelihood = - 4203.73
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.36
TABLE 7
Actual and Predicted Distributions of Labor Supply
and AFDC Participation
(Percentage of sample)
                      Labor Supply                      
Nonworkers Part Time Full Time Row Total
Actual
Off AFDC 9.9% 21.3% 36.3% 67.5%
On AFDC 26.3% 4.4% 1.9% 32.5%
Column Total 36.2% 25.6% 38.2% 100.0%
Predicted
Off AFDC 4.6% 26.0% 32.6% 63.2%
On AFDC 34.0% 2.8% 0.0% 36.8%
Column Total 38.6% 28.8% 32.6% 100.0%39
actual), and overpredicts AFDC nonworkers (34.0 percent predicted vs. 26.3 percent actual). The model
slightly overpredicts AFDC participation: 36.8 percent predicted vs. 32.5 percent actual.
The estimated coefficients can be used to analyze the impacts of the 1981 reforms on participation
and labor supply, and to simulate the effects of other policy changes. A particular advantage of the
structural approach is that it allows the effects of the various changes imposed in 1981 to be decomposed.
The 1981 legislation had two major impacts on AFDC rules: stricter eligibility rules and higher effective
tax rates on earnings. At the same time, nearly every state’s need and payment standards were declining in
real terms. Individuals’ behavior as recorded in the data is a function of all three of these variables. By
holding two of the variables constant while allowing the third to change, the impact of each variable can be
simulated separately.
Table 8 shows the results of this simulation. Each section of Table 8 shows the impact of a policy
change on the AFDC participation rate and the labor supply choices of both recipients and nonrecipients.
The impact on AFDC eligibility by labor-supply group is also given. Finally, the effect on government
expenditures for AFDC, Food Stamp, and total benefits are reported in the three rightmost columns.
The first section shows the effect of subjecting the full sample to the pre-1981 environment. Under
this benchmark scenario, recipients face an unrestricted thirty-and-a-third disregard of earnings, more
generous eligibility standards, and real need and payments standards fixed at 1978 levels. In this
environment, 47.4 percent of the sample would participate in AFDC, and 19 percent of recipients would
choose to work part time. None of the sample would choose to work full time.
The isolated effect of the higher benefit-reduction rate is shown in the second section. This change
by itself reduced AFDC participation slightly, and severely reduced the proportion of recipients who work,
from 19 percent to just 2 percent. The effect of this change on AFDC eligibility is strong: the percentage of
part-time workers eligible falls from 76 percent to 57 percent, and theTABLE 8
Decomposed Effects of the 1981 Reforms on Labor Supply and AFDC Participation
                               Effect on Behavior                                           Effect on Government Expenditures         
  Total AFDC FS AFDC's
          Labor Supply Choice          % ch from % ch from % ch from share of
AFDC Choice No Work  Part Time Full Time  bench  bench  bench total
Benchmark: Pre-OBRA81 Rules off AFDC 52.6% of which: 8.3% 43.6% 48.1%
(Fix BRR, Elig, Real Bens) on AFDC 47.4% of which: 81.3% 18.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 81%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 76% 26%
Change BRR Only off AFDC 55.2% of which: 7.9% 42.1% 50.0%
(Fix Eligibility, Real Benefits) on AFDC 44.8% of which: 98.3% 1.7% 0.0% 1.6% 0.1% 7.9% 80%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 57% 12%
Change Eligibility Only off AFDC 54.8% of which: 8.0% 42.9% 49.1%
(Fix BRR, Real Benefits) on AFDC 45.3% of which: 82.8% 17.2% 0.0% -9.5% -9.6% -9.2% 81%
percent eligible for AFDC: 80% 56% 15%
OBRA81: Change BRR and Eligibility off AFDC 57.1% of which: 7.7% 41.5% 50.9%
(Fix Real Benefits) on AFDC 42.9% of which: 98.5% 1.5% 0.0% -8.1% -9.1% -3.4% 80%
percent eligible for AFDC: 80% 49% 11%
Change Real Benefits Only off AFDC 62.4% of which: 7.4% 41.6% 51.1%
(Fix BRR, Eligibility) on AFDC 37.7% of which: 92.1% 7.9% 0.0% -26.5% -32.5% -0.9% 75%
percent eligible for AFDC: 83% 52% 14%
Post-OBRA81 Environment off AFDC 66.4% of which: 7.2% 41.0% 51.9%
(Change BRR, Elig and Real Bens) on AFDC 33.6% of which: 99.6% 0.5% 0.0% -31.4% -36.8% -8.2% 75%
percent eligible for AFDC: 76% 41% 6%41
percentage of eligible full-time workers falls from 26 percent to 12 percent. This change is also associated
with a slight (1.6 percent) increase in government expenditures on benefits, mostly from higher Food Stamp
benefits.
The remainder of the table can be interpreted in a similar fashion. A striking result from Table 8 is
the strong effect of the decline in real benefit standards over the 1978 to 1984 period. Lower real needs
standards reduce AFDC eligibility nearly as much as higher benefit-reduction rates and tighter eligibility
standards combined. Moreover, the combination of lower real needs and payment standards reduced the
participation rate in AFDC by more than the two OBRA81 changes combined. The lower real standards
also provided a significant work disincentive in their own right, increasing the proportion of recipients who
do not work from the benchmark of 81 percent to 92 percent. Finally, the lower real standards resulted in a
26.5 percent savings in welfare expenditures. This figure rises to 32.5 percent if Food Stamp benefits,
which are indexed to inflation, are excluded. An important result is that for many recipients, the share of
Food Stamps in total income increased as real AFDC benefits declined. Hence the Food Stamps program
played an important role over this period in preventing the well-being of welfare recipients from eroding
more than it did.
The structural coefficients can also be used to predict the impacts of new policy changes. Table 9
shows the results of several simulations of hypothetical policy changes. The first two simulations in Table
9 show the effect of cutting needs and payment standards by 50 percent each. The lower needs standard
significantly reduces AFDC eligibility for workers, but has a surprisingly small effect on both AFDC
participation and labor supply. The same cut in payment standards, however, produces major changes. The
effect on AFDC eligibility is only slightly stronger than it was for the reduction in needs standards. But
AFDC participation falls by nearly half, and working recipiency nearly doubles. This suggests that
individuals respond much more strongly to the payment standard than the need standard. A significant
proportion respond to lower payment standards byTABLE 9
Simulated Effects of the Hypothetical Policy Changes on Labor Supply and AFDC Participation
                               Effect on Behavior                                           Effect on Government Expenditures         
  Total AFDC FS AFDC's
          Labor Supply Choice          % ch from % ch from % ch from share of
AFDC Choice No Work  Part Time Full Time  bench  bench  bench total
Benchmark: Pre-OBRA81 Rules off AFDC 52.6% of which: 8.3% 43.6% 48.1%
on AFDC 47.4% of which: 81.3% 18.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 81%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 76% 26%
Cut Needs Standards 50% off AFDC 54.5% of which: 8.4% 44.8% 46.8%
on AFDC 45.5% of which: 81.3% 18.8% 0.0% -8.8% -7.8% -13.1% 82%
percent eligible for AFDC: 78% 58% 9%
Cut Payment Standards 50% off AFDC 75.6% of which: 6.1% 38.8% 55.1%
on AFDC 24.4% of which: 66.6% 33.4% 0.0% -68.9% -78.0% -29.6% 57%
percent eligible for AFDC: 74% 47% 6%
Set BRR to 75% off AFDC 54.6% of which: 8.0% 42.4% 49.5%
on AFDC 45.4% of which: 92.5% 7.5% 0.0% 0.8% -0.4% 5.6% 80%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 69% 20%
Set BRR to 50% off AFDC 44.9% of which: 9.8% 48.4% 41.9%
on AFDC 55.1% of which: 49.3% 50.7% 0.0% 8.4% 14.3% -16.9% 86%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 84% 46%
Set BRR to 33% off AFDC 36.0% of which: 12.0% 53.7% 34.3%
on AFDC 64.0% of which: 34.2% 65.8% 0.0% 30.6% 43.2% -23.4% 89%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 89% 74%
(table continues)TABLE 9, continued
                               Effect on Behavior                                           Effect on Government Expenditures         
  Total AFDC FS AFDC's
          Labor Supply Choice          % ch from % ch from % ch from share of
AFDC Choice No Work  Part Time Full Time  bench  bench  bench total
Benchmark: Pre-OBRA81 Rules off AFDC 52.6% of which: 8.3% 43.6% 48.1%
on AFDC 47.4% of which: 81.3% 18.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 81%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 76% 26%
Set Child Cap at Two off AFDC 57.5% of which: 7.8% 43.0% 49.2%
on AFDC 42.5% of which: 77.6% 22.4% 0.0% -20.5% -19.1% -26.6% 83%
percent eligible for AFDC: 86% 74% 23%
Impose $5.25 Minimum Wage off AFDC 53.2% of which: 8.0% 44.1% 47.9%
on AFDC 46.8% of which: 80.2% 19.8% 0.0% -1.8% -1.5% -3.2% 81%
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 75% 24%
Provide 10% Wage Subsidy off AFDC 60.0% of which: 6.2% 44.9% 48.9%
on AFDC 40.0% of which: 81.5% 18.5% 0.0% 13.4% -15.6% -14.7% 60%
a
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 70% 20%
Provide 50% Wage Subsidy off AFDC 77.3% of which: 2.9% 58.6% 38.5%
on AFDC 22.7% of which: 86.2% 13.8% 0.0% 115.8% -51.6% -47.3% 18%
a
percent eligible for AFDC: 88% 47% 7%
Includes the cost of the subsidy.
a44
leaving AFDC, while another significant proportion respond by increasing work effort to offset lower
benefits.
The bottom three sections of Table 9 demonstrate the effect of changing the benefit-reduction rate
to values that states have recently considered. Progressively lower rates result in progressively higher
AFDC eligibility and AFDC participation. Moreover, lower tax rates encourage working recipiency: at a
benefit-reduction rate of 33 percent, fully two-thirds of recipients choose to work. The downside to lower
rates is the effect on expenditures for benefits: lowering the rate to 33 percent would increase expenditures
on AFDC benefits by 43 percent. While this would be partly offset by lower Food Stamp expenditures, the
net increase in expenditures would still be 31 percent. The effect of the benefit-reduction rate on AFDC
participation and working recipiency is illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the net effect of the benefit-
reduction rate on the labor supply of female heads of household. The figure shows that increased work
among AFDC recipients who face lower benefit-reduction rates is offset by lower work among women
drawn onto AFDC. Hence the net effect of the benefit-reduction rate on the labor supply of female heads of
household is quite small.
Several states recently have proposed a “child cap” that would remove the increase in the AFDC
benefit associated with additional children. A child cap of two children reduces participation slightly, and
increases working recipiency as some participants increase labor supply to offset lost benefits. Imposing a
minimum wage of $5.25 reduces participation and increases working recipiency very slightly.
Providing a wage subsidy of 10 percent to all female heads of household with children is successful
in reducing participation from 47 percent to 40 percent, but it has virtually no effect on the labor supply of
recipients. On the expenditure side, while resulting in a 16 percent savings in benefit expenditures, the cost
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Providing a more ambitious wage subsidy of 50 percent has very dramatic results on AFDC
participation, but less successful effects on labor supply and expenditures. AFDC participation falls by
more than half, from 47 percent to 23 percent. But working recipiency falls from 19 percent to 14 percent,
as fewer recipients remain eligible with the higher wages. This effect could be reduced by disregarding the
subsidized portion of wages, but this would naturally entail even higher expenditures. Even without
disregarding subsidized wages, the resulting savings of 52 percent of AFDC expenditures is not enough to
offset the cost of paying the subsidy, producing a net increase in expenditures of 116 percent.
Table 9 shows varying responsiveness in AFDC participation and labor-supply choices to different
policy tools. This information is summarized in Table 10, which shows measures of responsiveness by
broad policy category. The AFDC participation response is defined as the percent change in the
participation rate for a 1 percent change in the policy parameter. The labor-supply response is measured by
the percent change in the proportion of recipients who work for a 1 percent change in the policy parameter.
Both participation and labor-supply choices were surprisingly unresponsive to changes in needs
standards. But both choices were quite responsive to changes in payment standards. Perhaps most relevant
for states considering new reforms is the result that manipulation of the benefit-reduction rate seems quite
powerful in altering both work and welfare decisions. Working recipiency is greatly encouraged by lower
tax rates, but at a cost of higher expenditures on benefits. Finally, the AFDC participation choice is quite
responsive to wage levels, but increasing wages has only small effects on working recipiency in the absence
of higher disregards.45
TABLE 10





Needs Standards 0.08 0.01
Payment Standards  0.97 1.57
Effective Tax Rates -0.64 -6.74
Real Wages -1.56 -0.11
(% change in participation)/(% change in x).
a
(% change in p) / (% change in x), where p = proportion of participants who work.
b48
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed an analytically tractable structural model of AFDC participation and
labor supply. The model was estimated on a sample of female heads of household over the years 1978 to
1984, a period which included a major change in AFDC payment and eligibility rules. The changes
imposed by the 1981 OBRA were accounted for explicitly in the budget set, as were declining real benefit
standards, changes in the federal tax system, and the interaction of AFDC and Food Stamps. Estimated
utility parameters were used to decompose the effects of the 1981 reforms. The overall effect of the
legislation was to reduce participation by about 8 percent and cut the incidence of working recipiency by
more than 40 percent.
Simulations suggest that lower real needs and payment standards reduced AFDC eligibility and
participation by more than the two OBRA81 changes combined. The lower real standards also provided a
significant work disincentive in their own right, increasing the proportion of recipients who do not work
from the benchmark of 81 percent up to 92 percent. Finally, the lower real standards resulted in a 26.5
percent savings in welfare expenditures. This figure rises to 32.5 percent if Food Stamp benefits, which are
indexed to inflation, are excluded. An important result is that for many recipients, the share of Food
Stamps in total income increased as real AFDC benefits declined. Hence the Food Stamps program played
an important role over this period in preventing the well-being of welfare recipients from eroding more than
it did.
Estimated utility parameters were also used to simulate the effects of hypothetical policy changes.
Both participation and labor-supply choices are quite responsive to changes in payment standards, holding
needs standards fixed. Lower payment standards cause some recipients to leave welfare and others to
increase their work effort. The benefit-reduction rate is quite powerful in altering work and welfare
decisions. Working recipiency is significantly encouraged by lower tax rates, but this is offset by lower49
labor supply among women drawn on to AFDC. Finally, the AFDC participation choice is quite responsive
to wage levels, but increasing wages would have only small effects on working recipiency in the absence of
higher disregards.51
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